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Abstract 
The biological immune system is an orchestrated, complex network that runs specialized defense reactions to inhibit infections of the 
whole organism. The immune system memorizes past infections and automatically builds up resilience. The paper analyses these and 
additional functions of biological immune systems and transfers them to personal communication processes in disaster situations. Based 
on this analogy, a cellular automaton was programmed to run different scenarios. The prototypical program simulates basic cascading 
disasters and provides findings regarding their development for different agent constellations. With the observations first practical 
implications are deduced for how to build up resilience in systems and to set up future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Communities build a huge network-system with a sensitive stability. Through increased connectivity and linkage 
between the systems, one supposedly small problem (“infection”) in a part of the network can spread to the whole network 
and trigger an epidemic crisis which, in turn, may cause a pandemic disaster to the whole network-system by rapidly 
infecting related structures. Research on cascading disasters has shown how seemingly tiny cascading problems are capable 
of disabling huge systems1.  
 
As in other scientific fields, a transdisciplinary look on nature can offer informative solutions: The biological immune 
defense is an evolution-proven problem solving system2,3. Its elements are coordinated in a complex network and can run 
specialized defense reactions to inhibit that core body functions break down. Furthermore, the immune system memorizes 
past infections and automatically builds up resilience. The field of disease (e.g. computer viruses) on complex networks is 
studied to wide range. The new approach is that the current paper transfers the functions of the biological immune system 
with the help of a cellular automaton to communication networks of personal interaction in case of cascading disasters4. 
This so-called ImmuniCation-approach is part of the scientific field of knowledge architecture that applies architectural 
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methods to solve transdisciplinary, complex problems by visualizing and modeling hidden system-processes. Thus, a 
programmed cellular automaton is used as a vehicle to visualize the identified, selected processes of immune systems. The 
aim of the study is to get hints how complex systems should deal with spreading disasters in future by distributing 
emergency specialists. By transferring the functions and elements of biological immune systems to cellular automata, 
practical implications for system design can be deduced (see fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Research design 
The paper is structured into five sections: Upon on this introduction, the second section explains in short the basic 
elements of the biological immune system and their functions. The explanations in this section are based on the works and 
publications of Abbas et al.5, Clancy6, Dasgupta et al.7,8, and Sompayrac9. These functions are transferred to a cellular 
automaton in the third section. In the fourth section the results of the analysis, its limitations, and deduced practical 
implications are presented. The final section gives some stimuli for further research. 
2. The biological immune system 
2.1. Three lines of defense 
The biological immune system consists of three lines of defense. The outer barriers of the body represent the first line – 
e.g. skin, mucous membranes, digestive system, and their respective secretions. If a pathogen surpasses these barriers, the 
unspecific defense system automatically kicks in. In this process, phagocytes – the natural immunity agents that are located 
all over the body – start to attack the invaders at the very spot. Thereby, the reaction is targeting at any pathogens. 
 
If the phagocytes at the spot of infection cannot cope with the amount, or type, of pathogens the specific reaction takes 
control. While the unspecific reaction works immediately, the specific defense system – as the third line of defense – will 
take effect with a time lag. Simultaneous to the unspecific reaction, messengers of the specific system already detect the 
type of pathogen and send the information to the lymph nodes. Hence, the detection-mechanism of the specific defense 
system is a decentralized one, however, the later reaction is at the very spot of infection. Contrary to the unspecific reaction, 
the specific defense system attacks every pathogen individually and remembers the different types so that a future defense 
will be more efficient and faster.  
2.2 Basic elements and their functions 
The approach of our study focuses on the second and third line of defense because they are activated when the immune 
reaction starts. From a systematic perspective, this is the moment when a problem sets off the stability of the network-
system, and potentially becomes a disaster. Since the specific and unspecific reactions are interconnected, some of the 
following elements are part of both defense systems.  
 
The macrophages play a central role. They are the first counteracting elements and are located all over the body. Their 
main task is to detect, encircle, and eat any pathogens as well as old or dead cells (phagocytosis). In addition, macrophages 
present antigens which, in turn, activate the specific immune system, and have receptors on their surface that can be 
combined with other components. Thus, macrophages can detect invaders that were marked suspicious by the specific 
immune system and destroy them more efficiently. Another function is to send out messengers calling up other cells and 
initiating the counteractions. 
 
The second key elements are the dendritic cells that are located all over the body, too. In an immature status, their main 
task is to detect and eat pathogens and then migrate further through in blood and lymphatic vessels to the lymph nodes. 
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Upon arrival, they fulfill their actual function: as then matured dendritic cells, they fragment the pathogens and display the 
pieces (antigens) on their cell surface. 
 
Helper T cells are rinsed in regular intervals through the lymph nodes and randomly bound to the displayed antigens of 
dendritic cells (called “B cells”) if they fit to the structure of the naive T cell receptor. After that, the helper T cells are 
activated and fragment quickly. Some of the T cells become cytotoxic T cells that migrate to the spot of infection guided by 
messengers of the macrophages and track down the pathogens as well as infected cells. 
 
B cells that also migrate to the wound can capture pathogens by antibodies and present the antigen like the macrophages. 
The activated helper T cells connect to the complexes. As a result the B cell is stimulated to enlarge and fragment itself and 
finally secretes an enormous amount of unbound antibodies. These antibodies specifically bind the pathogen and trigger 
their destruction. Plasma cells memorize the antibodies. The helper T cells also connect to the macrophages signalizing 
them that the eaten pathogens have to be destroyed efficiently. 
 
This simplified description of the immune reaction and the interaction of the different actors form the model for a 
cellular automaton that will be described in the forthcoming paragraph. 
3. Transfer to a cellular automaton 
3.1. Approach and rules 
For a prototypical model of disaster-resilience based on before mentioned functions of the immune system, a cellular 
automaton was created in the visual programming language Grasshopper, a well-established architectural modeling tool 
running within the Rhinoceros 3D CAD application. For this first version of the cellular automaton, Grasshopper provided 
all needed programming functions – and thus provides a hint to the multi-purpose-capacity of certain architectural methods 
in transdisciplinary research. 
 
As the aim of the study is not a one-to-one translation of biological to communicational structure, several elements and 
functions of the immune system are either taken apart or put together. In addition to the interpretation of the biological 
immune system´s elements as agents, the basic principles of the immune system were used to define the programming rules 
for the cellular automaton. The following functions were considered: 
 
• Interplay of unspecific and specific immune reaction  
• Exponential spread of pathogens (infection) 
• Building up immunity  
• Location and distribution of involved cells 
 
To ensure clarity, all agents will be named hereupon once with their immune system counterparts in brackets. In addition 
to that, the explanations are complemented with a real case scenario of a flood hitting a city, thus illustrating the 
applicability of the model to actual disaster cases. 
 
With the cellular automaton running in iterative loops, the following descriptions show the development of the different 
agents depending on their moore neighborhood. In the following paragraphs all defined agents are explained in short. At the 
end of the next chapter table 1 includes all concrete rules of the cellular automaton. 
3.2. Agents 
Cascading problem (pathogen): The problem occurs randomly. As is the case with pathogens, the severity of the 
problem (P) increases depending on the number of problems (P) in the neighborhood. Flood example: As a consequence of 
a long rain period, the water level of a river rises and threatening the civilians living next to the riverside. With the 
downpour not ceasing, the water level rises, until turning into a dangerous flood – the low value problem turns into a high 
value problem by number. While a normal, high water level can be handled by conventional people evacuation and 
countermeasures (i.e. closing the flood gates) along the riverside, a flood can only be fought by building new, or saving 
existing dams. This is to be carried out by civilians and specialists like policemen, firefighters, engineers or soldiers. 
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Unaffected person: Unaffected Persons (UAP) are not direct neighbors of an occurring problem. They have knowledge 
that is either irrelevant and unspecific to the problem (UUC), relevant and specific (USC) (inactive cytotoxic T cells & B 
cells), or they tend to ignore the upcoming problem (UIG). Still, they are not affected or activated. Flood example: 
Unaffected persons are those not living next to the riverside, who are consequently not at risk (UAP) in the first stance. Yet 
depending on the water level they may be affected (DAP) in the course of events. In this case, it makes a difference whether 
they have special knowledge for a counteraction (USC) (i.e. know-how for building a dam or turning off the electricity 
support) or not (UUC). 
 
Directly affected person: Directly Affected Persons (DAP) are directly connected to the occurring problem and can 
obtain the following values depending on their reaction behavior and their individual knowledge. Flood example: People 
that are directly exposed to the water are immediately impacted. 
 
• DOV (infected cells): DAPs that are unable to counteract because they were affected by the problem. Their inability 
to act can finally result in a problem. Thus, DOV becomes a P or remains DOV depending on the amount of neighbor 
P, and USC / DSC that slow down the infection of P. When the problem disappears (P=0) it regenerates and changes 
to a mainly immune USC because it is now equipped with special knowledge once it was hit by a problem - like an 
infected body that becomes immune. Flood example: People whose places are flooded, who are not any longer able 
to fight against the flood, and must be supported (DOV) - because otherwise, as helpless victims they will turn into a 
problem as well. For another flood in the future, they will have already built up specific knowledge how to 
counteract a flood (USC). 
 
• DIG (non-detecting macrophages & dendritic cells): DAPs that do not recognize or ignore the problem have no 
counteraction. Consequently, DIG becomes P in the following round if there is at minimum one P in the 
neighborhood - regardless if there are also USC / DSC. Flood example: People that ignore or just do not know the 
risks of a flood (i.e. danger of collapse of buildings by water undermining) and are unwilling to get support (DIG). 
Therefore, they themselves turn problematic (P). 
 
• DUC (active macrophages & dendritic cells): DAPs that have no knowledge for a specific counteraction have a low 
counteraction. The more DUC is surrounded by P, the faster it gets “infected”. In these cases it skips the status DOV 
and turns directly to P in the following round. DAPs that have no knowledge but are directly connected to an agent 
that has knowledge for a specific counteraction have a middle counteraction. Thus, if DUC is surrounded by USC / 
DSC the severity of P is reduced. For example, DUC can remain DUC if there are not more than one P and at 
minimum one USC / DSC in the neighborhood. Flood example: People that try to fight the rising water but have no 
special knowledge (DUC) – e.g. building dams with structural weaknesses, eventually not being strong enough. 
People who are not trained for a flood counteraction get instructions (i.e. how to efficiently fill sandbags) from 
firefighters, policemen or soldiers to improve their counteraction (DUC + USC / DSC). 
 
• DSC (active plasma cells & cytotoxic T cells): DAPs that have knowledge for a specific counteraction have a high 
counteraction. Thus, if a DSC has contact to only one P it remains a DSC. If it is next to two P it becomes DUC for the 
moment. And if it faces more than two P it becomes DOV. DAPs that have knowledge for a specific counteraction 
and are directly connected to an agent that also has knowledge for a specific counteraction unfold the highest 
counteraction. Thus, if DSC is surrounded by USC / DSC the severity of P is reduced or even eliminated depending on 
both numbers. Flood example: Firefighters, policemen or soldiers are trained how to act in case of a flood (DSC). 
Consequently, they can effectively decrease the damage caused by high water level. In the case of a flood 
approaching, effective counteraction needs a group of specialists plus helping people. Without such massive 
support, even the specialists would have to resign. If many firefighters, policemen and soldiers closely collaborate, 
they can raise an optimal counteraction. Because of their mutual assistance they cannot turn into a problem 
themselves (DSC + USC / DSC). 
 
The following table 1 gives a concrete overview to all defined agents, and how they transform depending to their 
neighboring agents:  
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Table 1. Agent overview 
State of agent Description Number of neighborhood of the agent Transition of agent 
P Problem DSC = 0 P 
DSC > 0  ≤ 8 AND P = 0 DOV 
DSC > 0  ≤ 8 AND P > 0  ≤ 8 P 
UUC UAPs with potential unspecific counteraction P = 0 UUC 
P > 0  ≤ 8 DUC 
USC UAPs with potential specific counteraction P = 0 USC 
P > 0  ≤ 8 DSC 
UIG UAPs with potential ignorance or non-detection P = 0 UIG 
P > 0  ≤ 8 DIG 
DOV Infected DAPs that are out of order / viral P = 0 USC 
P = 1 AND (USC + DSC = 0) P 
P = 1 AND (USC + DSC > 0 ≤ 8) DOV 
P = 2 AND (USC + DSC ≥ 0 < 2) P 
P = 2 AND (USC + DSC ≥ 2  ≤ 8) DOV 
P > 2  ≤ 8 P 
DIG Ignoring or non-detecting DAPs P = 0 UIG 
P > 0  ≤ 8 P 
DUC DAPs with unspecific counteraction P = 0 USC 
P = 1 AND (USC + DSC = 0) DOV 
P = 1 AND (USC + DSC > 0 ≤ 8) DUC 
P = 2  DOV 
P > 2 ≤ 8 AND (USC + DSC = 0) P 
P > 2 ≤ 8 AND (USC + DSC > 0 ≤ 8) DOV 
DSC DAPs with specific counteraction P = 0 USC 
P = 1 DSC 
P = 2 AND (USC + DSC = 0) DUC 
P = 2 AND (USC + DSC > 0 ≤ 8) DSC 
P > 2 ≤ 8 AND (USC + DSC = 0) DOV 
P > 2 ≤ 8 AND (USC + DSC > 0 ≤ 8) DSC 
4. Results of the analysis 
4.1. Observations 
As the translation of the functions of the immune system to a cellular automaton is not a trivial pursuit, the defined 
programming rules still do not cover a automatically transformation of real world data to special constellations. The code is 
still in configuration in order to be customized for specific scenarios (e.g. influence outbreak, flood catastrophes) in future. 
 
Nevertheless, some interesting findings were observed by running the program with different distributions of the agents 
USC and UUC as well as P before the simulation was started. The following figures show the round-based transformation of 
the cells. Every simulation started at t0. tn stands for the loops of the cellular automaton. The transformation of cells is 
updated synchronously. Consequently, the figures can be compared in their development in time. For an easier analysis of 
the development every type of agent is colored differently: P = red, UUC = light-green, USC = dark-green, DOV = light-blue, 
DUC = yellow, and DSC = brown. 
 
1) Exponential threat: In the first simulation one P was placed in the center of a 9x9 square of agents with non-specific 
counteractions (UUC). The capability for counteraction of the agents decreased with the problem´s severity (amount of P) – 
the whole system collapsed within short time (see fig. 2). Flood example: The rising water becomes exponentially 
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dangerous because the flooding area gets bigger when natural dams or other safety constructions are exceeded and no 
knowledge of specialists is available. 
 
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
        
Fig. 2.  Exponential outbreak (t0 to t7) 
2) Building up immunity: In this scenario the capability of building up immunity and its impact on the whole system´s 
balance was tested. The first simulation (see fig. 3) shows that there are three loops needed to solve the problem and three 
agent were DOV. As stated before, the infected agents (DOV) turn into specialists (USC) afterwards. This development showed 
its effect when a second sequence of an outbreaking problem (P) was set at the same position (see fig. 4) – but now in the 
middle of USC. In this case there is only one DOV after the second loop. These simulations show that especially problems 
with a low value cause a fast immunization of agents, which had no special knowledge for counteraction before. With these 
new specialists the whole systems has a stronger immunity. Flood example: Unprepared people that where hit by a flood 
once normally know how to act when a similar disaster strikes again. In addition, they also can share their knowledge with 
people that have to handle the flood for the first time. 
 
t0 t1 t2 t3 
    
Fig. 3.  Building up immunity (t0 to t3) 
t0 t1 t2 t3 
    
Fig. 4.  Second simulation after immunication (t0 to t3) 
3) Distribution of specialists: A final analysis investigated different constellations and distributions of specialists (USC) in 
a direct second row: one side, three sides and all four side. As a result, the following was observed: A regular distribution, 
and the amount of agents with knowledge for specific counteraction (USC), stopped the cascading problem earlier and saved 
more agents that had no specific knowledge. This becomes evident by comparing the synchronous and separated 
developments in figure 5, 6 and 7 (please note: these simulations are not in sequence). Flood example: If emergency 
specialists are equally distributed, and not too concentrated, they can spread their knowledge for a specific counteraction to 
a broader audience and give effective instructions. In this way, non-specialists improve their counteraction and build i.e. 
more reliable dams or use pumps more effectively. 
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t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
        
t8 t9 t10 t11     
    
    
Fig. 5.  Fast outbreak with only one specialist (t0 to t11) 
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
        
t8 t9 t10 t11     
    
    
Fig. 6.  Outbreak with several specialists - irregular distribution (t0 to t11) 
t0 t1 
  
Fig. 7.  No outbreak with regular distribution of specialists (t0 to t1) 
As a theoretical case study a flood scenario was chosen to demonstrate the cellular automaton and the described, single 
processes in a bigger scale. The following matrix (fig. 8) shows a section of a river whose rised water level turned 
problematic (red: P > 2). The DAPs (yellow) are counteracting the flood (i.e. by building dams). Depending on the 
distribution of the specialists (dark-green) and the course of the river – both chosen randomly – the expansion of the water 
was slowed down or stopped for a while at the spots of grouped specialists. 
 
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
      
Fig. 8.  Theoretical case study: flood (t0 to t11) 
4.2. Practical implications for system design 
The experiments have shown that functions of the immune system can be basically simulated in a simplified application. 
From the observations in chapter 4.1 the following implications can be inferred for communities, which want to improve 
their resilience:  
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1) Creating awareness: As we showed in observation one - Exponential Threat, a cascading problem can overrun a 
system very fast. But very often persons within systems are not aware of cascading problem´s severity. As a result, they 
indirectly support the spread with their ignorance (see DIG). Consequently, on the one hand, an awareness of the meaning of 
the interconnected problems as well as of the vulnerability of the whole system must be created, so that the amount of 
ignoring agents is reduced to a minimum. This, in turn, is strengthening the immunity. For example information-events with 
a transdisciplinary focus could help synchronizing the acknowledgment of problems, building up group intelligence, and 
improving the problem-detection later on10. 
 
2) Problem training: Regarding observation two - Building up Immunity, the resistance of a system can be increased if 
agents have gone through a specific problem before. Thus, it is helpful that communities (or a part of it) have to face some 
potential, but made-up problems in training situations time by time. They will build up specialist´s knowledge and be better 
prepared to counteract in a crisis situation. In the flood example civilians learn in information events how to build dams 
when there is high water. This knowledge can be called-up and applied again (USC). Later on, in times of a strong flood they 
act as specialist and are able to effectively fight higher water levels e.g. with a solid dam construction. As a result, disaster 
management should be based on trained knowledge11,12,13. The recurring training is especially important when there are 
larger time intervals between disasters. In these cases, the period of normalization causes the loss of knowledge, and 
specialized counteraction falls into oblivion14. 
 
3) Implementing specialists: By interpreting the results of observation three - Distribution of Specialists, the equally 
constellation of specialists in a system increases the immunity. Because of the overall neighborhood these specialist can 
share their knowledge for a specific counteraction and, in turn, improve the resilience of the non-specialists. Thus, as the 
immune system shows, specialists should be distributed throughout all parts of a community in times of crisis. These 
equally distributed specialists could be achieved via additional training for “normal” citizens that build up knowledge for 
disaster counteraction or special problem solving coordination. 
4.3. Limitations and future research 
These experiments have its limitations. Especially the “human factor” and unpredictable groups dynamics are hard to 
represent15,16. Hence, improvements, specifications and extensions on the following aspects shall be in the focus for future 
research:  
 
Containing problems: Up to now, the presented program simulates only the cascading problem´s speed of spreading and 
the system´s capacity of blocking problems. As a next step, the active agent´s reduction of the problem´s severity should be 
included so that containment can be presented. For that, further differentiations of agents and problems are needed. 
Thereafter, interaction with unaffected agents that are not in the direct neighborhood should be included. On this condition, 
a transmission of specific knowledge for counteraction will be possible. Furthermore, agents should be able to alarm other 
agents and make them immune by distance, which is of special interest in regards to agents that are not able to detect 
problems. 
 
Dynamic agent model: For further research, it is also planned to leave the form of a cellular automaton in order to 
include the movement of agents. The aim is that specialists can not only transmit their knowledge but also move to the spot 
of the problem. Furthermore, control units will be integrated. They enforce the whole counteraction of the system by the 
complex coordination of the agents.  
 
Adaption to disaster scenarios: Finally, the program should be customizable and simulate communication processes in 
communities for different constellations of cascading disasters. This could be one way to measure their resilience17. 
Therefore, at first, agents´ behavior, constellation und vulnerability must be identified and transformed to specific, typical 
disaster scenarios. Afterwards, the simulation should be combined with other urban planning approaches18,19,20. For 
example, in case of a flood the distribution of fire fighters, soldiers and policemen can be predicted to increase a more 
efficient as well as dynamic counteraction. 
1341 Peter Schmiedgen et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  35 ( 2014 )  1333 – 1341 
5. Conclusion 
Former studies – especially in bioinformatics8,21,22 – have recognized the unique functions and processes of the immune 
system, and translated them into research models. However, the role of smart communication structures in the field of 
disaster resilience still remains a field in needs for intensified investigation. 
 
The paper has shown that functions of the biological immune system as a well-working natural model of disaster 
management can be prototypically applied to a cellular automaton that in turn is used to analyze basic communication 
structures and agents in systems. This method makes it possible to scale up and simulate complex disaster scenarios and to 
deduce individual measures for different system designs in future.  
 
First findings have shown that specialists with the capability for a specific counteraction to a cascading problem should 
be equally distributed in a system. Furthermore, organizations build up resilience very fast once they had fought a small 
problem successfully. Consequently, preparatory trainings with made-up problems can be deduced as a practical 
implication. Finally, the exponential cascading of disasters was verified, implying that systems should increase their 
awareness of cascading problems in order to block them in an early stadium.  
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